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Investigating differences in Brexit-vote among Local Authorities in the UK: An ecological study on 
migration- and economy-related issues 
Abstract 
During a non-binding referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU in June 2016, 51.9% of UK 
voters voted in favour of leaving the EU, also known as Brexit. However, the Local Authorities in the 
UK showed a wide variation in the referendum outcome. For 380 Local Authorities, the EU 
referendum outcome was linked to data derived from the 2011 Census, creating a database to 
investigate associations between local factors and the referendum outcome. This ecological study 
formulated and tested hypotheses related to migration and economic issues as those two topics 
dominated the EU referendum campaign. The results of multivariable generalised linear model 
analyses showed that the percentage of migrants arrived between 2004-2011 in local areas was 
positively associated with the proportion of Leave-votes. This indicates that the relative number of 
recently arrived migrants might have been a key factor in voters’ decision. Further research might 
focus on the origin of those migrants. Furthermore, in England the percentage of lower educated 
was positively associated with the proportion of Leave-votes. This indicates that England was divided 
along educational lines. Moreover, this study also found a positive association between the 
proportion of elderly with self-reported poorer general health and the proportion of Leave-votes. 
Although investigating local health outcomes was beyond the study’s aim, this result indicates that 
health issues might be of importance in understanding local differences in EU referendum outcomes. 
These findings provide us with a better understanding of the underlying factors of the Brexit-vote 
and directions for future research. 
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Introduction 
During the European Communities membership referendum in June 1975, 67.2% voted ‘Yes’ to the 
question whether the United Kingdom (UK) should stay in the European Community. In 1975 the UK 
had been a member for two years of the European Economic Community (EEC). In line with the 
outcome of the referendum, the UK continued to be a member of the EEC. The membership of the 
European Union (EU), which replaced and succeeded the European Community in 2009 which had 
replaced the EEC in 1993, was questioned again 41 years after the first referendum. David Cameron, 
the Conservative Prime Minister of the UK, had promised in January 2013 a referendum on whether 
the UK should remain a member of the EU when the Conservatives would win the elections in 2015. 
After they won, the EU Referendum Act 2015 allowed for the holding of a non-binding referendum 
in the UK and Gibraltar before the end of 2017 (Thompson 2016). On 23 June 2016 72.2% of the 
electorate voted, and a majority (51.9%) voted in favour of leaving the EU.1 This outcome is also 
known as Brexit.  
The referendum result, however, differed among the four countries in the UK. In Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, a minority voted to leave the EU, 38.0% and 44.2%, respectively. In Wales and 
England, a majority voted to leave the EU, 52.5% and 53.4%, respectively. In some Local Authorities 
within England and Wales, a very large majority, over 80%, voted to remain in the EU. By contrast in 
some other Local Authorities a far majority, over 70%, voted to leave the EU.2 These voting results 
show a wide variation in local EU referendum outcomes. By comparing the outcomes among the 
Local Authorities in the UK, the aim is to explore the relationship between local factors and the EU 
referendum outcome in an ecological study – that is comparing groups rather than individuals. Since 
the referendum campaign focused mainly on migration- and economy-related issues, the research 
question is, how are economic and migration issues associated with voting to leave the EU? Studying 
this question could shed light on social cleavages within the UK and could inform us on underlying 
factors of the Brexit-vote. 
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Campaign themes and media coverage 
The UK referendum on EU membership forced voters into a Remain or Leave debate. Hence, two 
campaigns emerged: the Leave campaign with the slogan ’Take Back Control’ and the Remain 
campaign with the slogan ‘Stronger In’. The Leave campaign positioned their arguments on long-
standing themes such as immigration, loss of sovereignty, expense of EU membership, and a growing 
sense of a detached liberal intelligentsia that failed to understand the plight faced by the poorest in 
society (Berry 2016; Crines 2016). The Remain campaign highlighted the benefits of access to the 
single market, fiscal stability, the free movement of people and ideas, and the potential risk to the 
economy by withdrawing from the EU (Crines 2016). 
The EU referendum debate was then built around two main themes, the Leave camp’s politicisation 
of immigration and the Remain camp’s economic argument about the risk of Brexit (Glencross 2016). 
The Remain camp’s focus on economic risks and expert endorsement on the economy might have 
resulted in a feeling that they represented an elite (Levy, Aslan & Bironzo 2016). Furthermore, it is 
argued that the Remain camp was unable to build a positive case for Europe, such as social and 
cultural benefits of EU membership, while Labour and Conservatives were largely running separate 
campaigns (Berry 2016). While Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn stressed workers’ rights at the end of 
the campaign, neither he nor David Cameron were able to imagine a wider case for the EU around 
other challenges such as climate change or the conflict in the Middle East (Hughes 2016). In 
Scotland, however, all the major political figures were united behind the Remain side (Higgins 2016). 
The Leave campaign was formed by two groups: ‘Vote Leave’ and ‘Grassroots Out/Leave.EU’. In that 
way, the Leave camp could reach different audiences, from parliamentary fundamentalists and 
nostalgic elderly to quasi racists as well as large sections of the discontented working poor by using a 
variety of messages (Berry 2016). Messages on immigration ranged from immigrants ‘sponging’ off 
the welfare state and ‘bleeding’ the National Health Service (NHS) dry to migrants being involved in 
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criminality (Berry 2016). UK Independence Party’s (UKIP) ‘Breaking point’ poster controversy – 
picturing a queue of Syrian refugees at the Slovenian border – claiming that ‘we must break free of 
the EU and take back control of our borders’, was highlighted as a key moment in the EU 
referendum campaign (Moore 2016). Cameron’s EU renegotiation resulting in an agreement in 
February 2016 – among others a phasing in of tax credits over four years for new EU migrants – was 
hardly something that mobilised the masses. For it was the number of new migrants, not their 
access to benefits, that exercised anti-EU voters. Hence Cameron’s EU renegotiation result might 
have played into the Leave camp’s hand by confirming the weakness of the government’s position 
over immigration within the EU (Glencross 2016). 
Media played an important role in getting messages across during the EU referendum campaign. It 
seems the Leave camp was better backed up by the media as Firmstone (2016) concluded that 
newspapers supporting Leave (Sun, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Times) 
published editorials on the EU referendum on more days, dedicated more resources and employed 
more compelling narratives and metaphors than the newspapers supporting Remain (Mirror, 
Guardian, Independent, Financial Times). Deacon et al.’s (2016) study on media (TV and newspapers) 
coverage of the EU referendum campaigns concluded that three issues dominated: the economy, 
immigration, and the conduct of the campaign itself. The economy received considerably more 
attention than immigration in the beginning of the campaign though later immigration took over 
economic issues, and this may have given the Leave campaign valuable momentum.  
 
Previously reported factors in understanding the Brexit-vote 
This section gives an overview of previously reported factors in understanding the Brexit-vote. It’s 
not aimed to give a complete overview but to address main issues published by journalists in the 
media, by research agencies in reports, and by scholars in academic journals; each of these sources 
has their own way of producing and presenting information. 
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Media 
After the EU referendum, the media published the outcome and highlighted some explanations to 
understand the vote to leave the EU. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) published the result 
in maps, showing in which voting area a higher proportion voted to leave the EU, and charts showing 
the differences in voting ‘Leave’ by age groups – age group 65+ showed highest proportion to vote 
‘Leave’ – making use of polling findings, and graphs to show referendum results for 30 areas with 
most elderly people, fewest graduates, and most people identifying as English using 2011 Census 
data.3 Other media such as The Guardian also presented maps. This newspaper showed separate 
figures for some ‘key demographics’ in each voting area, such as proportion with higher education, 
median annual income, median age of residents, and proportion of residents not born in the UK to 
show associations with the outcome, though the used source is not given. From those figures The 
Guardian concluded that ‘the best predictor of a vote for Remain is the proportion of residents who 
have a degree’.4 The Telegraph also showed maps and highlighted 12 regions, such as ‘West-
Midlands votes to Leave’ while remarking ‘Birmingham has high immigration from non-EU areas’. 
The Independent showed ‘7 graphs that explain how Brexit won’. One of the graphs showed that of 
Conservative voters about 58% voted to leave the EU and among Labour voters this was about 37%. 
Post-referendum surveys 
As NatCen’s British Social Attitudes surveys showed a growing support over the past decades for 
leaving the EU peaking at around 30% in 2012,5 pre-referendum surveys in 2016 showed a further 
increasing support for leaving the EU with a majority voting ‘Leave’ at the referendum day.6 To get a 
better understanding of the EU referendum outcome, some research agencies conducted a post-
referendum survey. YouGov conducted a survey on Election Day, predicting a small majority (around 
52%) voting to remain in the EU; among respondents who said to have voted Remain, for around 
40% of them the main argument was that they believed a better UK economy is within the EU, and 
for those who said to have voted Leave, for respectively around 45% and 26% of them the main 
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arguments were Britain’s right to act independently and immigration.7 BMG research concluded 
from their post-referendum survey that respondents who were unemployed or retired were most 
positive about the referendum outcome while there was also a substantial generational divide with 
younger generations expressing far more concern than baby boomers on the outcome.8 A post-
referendum survey conducted by Panelbase for the newly founded newspaper The New European 
showed that for most of the Remain-voters the economy was a key issue while for Leave-voters it 
was immigration. Furthermore, it found no evidence for regret – if another referendum was held 
soon, it would return to the same result.9  
Scholarly articles 
A few scholarly articles published early 2016 raised issues which could play a crucial role during the 
EU referendum campaign. Vasilopoulou (2016) explored British Euroscepticism by analysing British 
attitudes towards the EU and concluded that utilitarian concerns regarding the cost and benefit of 
European integration could have a strong influence on the vote choice but only when combined with 
pro- or anti-arguments on EU freedom of movement. Henderson et al. (2016) found that the English 
are more Eurosceptic than neighbouring countries and predicted that if the Remain camp fails to 
articulate a cultural case for EU membership the Leave camp might dominate the ‘cultural’ 
dimension of the debate by convincing voters that English national identity is inconsistent with 
membership of the EU. Furthermore, according to Qvortrup (2016) the Leave camp’s chance to win a 
majority of votes in the EU referendum increases when turnout rates are higher as he found such an 
association from studying all 43 EU-related referendums since 1972. 
After the referendum, some first scholarly reactions were published in editorials or forums to shed 
some light on the EU referendum outcome. In his editorial for BMJ, Dorling (2016) stated that the 
outcome of the EU referendum has been unfairly blamed on the working class in the north of 
England because of differences in turnout and population size; most people who voted to leave the 
EU lived in the south of England. Furthermore, among those who voted to leave the EU a majority 
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was middle class, making this class crucial to the result. In his editorial for European Societies, Lianos 
(2016) put forward that Eurosceptic middle-class conservatives and working-class nationalists 
constituted a majority of the Leave-vote, while also some left-wing voters outside London 
unexpectedly voted to leave the EU. In an anthropology forum on Brexit, Koch (Green et al. 2016) 
emphasised that in the most deprived areas people have been disillusioned with politics for decades. 
Different from other elections is that during the EU referendum many decided to vote as it was a 
vote ‘to refuse government as such’ and to get back ‘local control’. Shore (Green et al. 2016) adds 
that the EU referendum exposed deep-seated tensions and pre-existing social cleavages in Britain.  
 
In summary, the media focused mostly on socio-demographic voting patterns according to age, 
income, educational level, and national identity. The post-referendum surveys reported on opinions 
about economy and immigration in relation to Brexit. In scholarly articles, some other issues were 
highlighted such as the impact of the turnout rate and group size on the result, and also socio-
demographic voting patterns according to deprivation and working- or middle-class. Most of these 
explanations, however, were ad hoc observations or conclusions drawn from maps, figures or 
frequency tables focussing on single factors. Following-up on Shore’s remark (Green et al. 2016) that 
the EU referendum showed Britain’s multiple split on economical and socio-demographic 
characteristics, this study will therefore conduct multiple regression analyses allowing to assess the 
independent effect of each factor, while controlling for confounding factors, testing hypotheses on 
migration and economic issues. 
 
Hypotheses 
The underlying mechanism this study uses to make inferences about local population characteristics 
and the vote to leave the EU is based on issue-voting (e.g., Denver & Hands 1990). Garry et al. (2005) 
investigated whether voters’ attitudes to Europe, so-called issue-voting explanation, or voters’ 
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attitudes to their national political parties and incumbent national government, so-called second-
order election model explanation, were more decisive in referendums on EU treaties using evidence 
from the two Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty in 2001 and 2002, respectively. They concluded 
that voters’ attitudes to Europe and the EU were of more importance and emphasised the 
importance of campaigning in EU referendums. This study will use the arguments expressed during 
the EU referendum campaign in 2016. The two main issues in the EU referendum campaign were 
migration and economy as described in the previous sections. In this section, hypotheses are 
formulated based on issues raised in the campaign on migration and economy. The focus is on 
arguments put forward by the Leave camp. 
Migration  
One of the Leave campaign’s arguments is that by leaving the EU, Britain will get back its control 
over its borders and will then be able to better control immigration. Such an argument might be 
stronger received in areas with relatively more immigrants. The immigrant hypothesis is (1): local 
areas having relatively more recently arrived migrants will show a higher proportion of voters having 
voted ‘Leave’.  When it’s rather about the assimilation of immigrants, one aspect might be the use of 
English language by immigrants as linguistic assimilation is an important indicator as well as a factor 
for in- or exclusion (Alba & Nee 2003: 72; Casey 2016: 94–8, 167–9). The English language hypothesis 
is (2): local areas where relatively more residents have English as their main language will show a 
lower proportion of voters having voted ‘Leave’. If it is not just about immigrant numbers but 
specifically about national identity10, it might be better to identify areas where relatively more 
residents hold an English, Welsh, Scottish and/or UK/British identity. In their study on the 
development of attitudes to Europe in England since 1975, Henderson et al. (2016) found a link 
between nationalism and Euroscepticism in England. The national identity hypothesis is (3): local 
areas where relatively more residents hold an English, Welsh, Scottish and/or UK, British identity will 
show a higher proportion of voters having voted ‘Leave’. 
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Economy  
Leaving the EU could be based on a hope for a better future or just to turn away from the 
contemporary financial or economic malaise combined with the sense of a detached liberal 
intelligentsia failing to understand the situation of the poorest (Berry 2016; Crines 2016; Levy, Aslan 
& Bironzo 2016). This could have been appealing to those at the lower rungs of society such as 
unemployed, employed in lower socio-economic status jobs, or lower-educated persons. The 
unemployment hypothesis is (4): local areas where relatively more residents are unemployed will 
show a higher proportion of voters having voted ‘Leave’. The socio-economic classification 
hypothesis is (5): local areas where relatively more residents are employed in lower socio-economic 
status jobs will show a higher proportion of voters having voted ‘Leave’. The educational level 
hypothesis is (6): local areas where relatively more residents are lower educated will show a higher 
proportion of voters having voted ‘Leave’. 
Other socio-demographic characteristics 
This study included also other socio-demographic characteristics. As those socio-demographic 
characteristics might have an impact on their own on the EU referendum outcome, differences in 
those socio-demographic characteristics between Local Authorities might also influence the impact 
of the migration and economic factors. As we have seen in the section on previously reported 
factors in understanding the Brexit-vote, it has been stated that elderly (aged 65+) had voted more 
often ‘Leave’. The proportion of elderly in an area might for example also be related to economic 
issues as relatively more elderly in an area might result in a lower percentage of residents with a 
university degree. As more men than women are active in the labour market, we might expect 
likewise a relation between the proportion of male residents in an area and economic issues such as 
employment or socio-economic job status. Some pointed at the relationship between health and 
voting outcome.11 People with poorer health might be more likely to worry about NHS access, which 
was one of the Leave campaign’s arguments. Those with poorer health might also be more often 
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unemployed while among elderly the proportion of those having poorer health might be higher than 
among adults younger than 65 years of age. Finally, the turnout rate is included in the analyses to 
adjust for potential differences in voting behaviour between Local Authorities. 
 
Sources, data and method 
When it comes to European elections it is argued that there is not one European election but many 
national ones whereby national circumstances are critical (Marsh 2002). Likewise, the EU 
referendum on UK’s EU membership was held in four countries: England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, 
and Wales. Whereas the referendum showed a majority in the UK voted to leave the EU, at the 
country level this outcome differed; a majority in England and Wales voted to leave the EU, but in 
Northern Ireland and Scotland, a majority voted to remain in the EU. It could also be argued that the 
referendum was not a national referendum but many local ones. Both the results of the EU 
referendum for Local Authorities in the UK and data on their demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics are publically available. As proposed by Johnston, Jones and Manley12 and shown by 
Tammes and Oude Nijhuis (2011) in their study on the Dutch rejection of the EU Constitutional 
Treaty in the 2005 referendum, this is an ideal opportunity to study the association between local 
characteristics and EU referendum outcomes using ecological data. 
 
Data sources 
Following Cummins et al. (2005), to collect local data one has to be aware of what data are available, 
their form, their spatial scale and the cost. The most obvious requirement of data for ecological 
studies is that data are spatially referenced. Information on the referendum outcome and local 
characteristics can be found for each Local Authority in the UK. The referendum outcomes are 
publically available for all Scottish, Welsh, and English Local Authorities, and Gibraltar and provided 
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by the electoral commission in an Excel file;13 no results were given for the Northern Irish districts. 
Data on Local Authority characteristics are publically available and provided by Infuse in Excel files. 
Since Local Authorities are given unique codes, these codes allow data to be merged into one file. 
The data used here are derived from the 2011 Census (Office for National Statistics et al. 2016), five 
years before the referendum.14 Using this data source all data on local characteristics are collected 
at the same time (27 March 2011) and in the same way (household survey) though a few questions 
were asked differently in the Scottish survey. However, during the five-year period population 
numbers have changed, such as the number of immigrants. The growth in immigrant population 
might differ between local areas and subsequently affect the ranking of local areas regarding the 
proportion of immigrants. To investigate whether local areas changed in ranking, middle layer super 
output areas (MSOA)15 are compared using data derived from the 2001 Census (Office for National 
Statistics et al. 2016) and the 2011 Census (Office for National Statistics 2011) on percentage of 
people born in the UK.16  Spearman's rank correlation (rs=0.919, N=7,040) shows a very high 
correlation between the ranking of MSOAs in 2001 and in 2011 regarding the percentage of people 
born in the UK. Likewise, the rankings according to the percentage of unemployed (rs=is 0.899, 
N=7,009) and the percentage of people aged 65 or over (rs= 0.833, N=7,037) were compared. These 
results indicate that the ranking of local areas in 2001 and in 2011 are very similar with regard to 
percentage of immigrants, unemployed, and elderly, and it is assumed that this is still the case in 
2016. Furthermore, it can be argued that it might not be the current situation that made up a voter’s 
opinion but experiences over the past years (life experience and feelings such as growing feeling of 
‘left behind’). Overall, data derived from the 2011 Census are therefore suitable for this study. 
EU referendum data 
EU referendum data provided by the electoral commission on their website include the electorate – 
the number of registered voters eligible to take part in this referendum, the number of voters, and 
the (valid) number of Leave- and Remain-votes.17 Using these data, we could determine for each 
12 
 
Local Authority the percentage of Leave-votes without Gibraltar and Northern Ireland, on average 
53.1% (Table 1).  
Ecological data on migration and economic issues 
Following Morgenstern (2008: 512), ecological measures can be classified into three types; 
aggregated measures: means or proportion of observations derived from individuals in each group, 
environmental measures: physical characteristics of a place, and global measures: attributes of 
groups, places, etc., for which there is no distinct analogue at the individual level such as population 
density. To test the formulated hypotheses our focus is on aggregated measures using the 2011 
Census (Office for National Statistics et al. 2016). 
 Migration issues 
To test the immigrant hypothesis, the study used the 2011 Census question on year of arrival in the 
UK to calculate the percentage of migrants arrived between 2004 and 2011 of the total population, 
on average 4.3% (Table 1). In 2004 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, and in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania became an EU member. To 
test the English language hypothesis, this study used the 2011 Census question on main language to 
calculate the percentage whose main language was English and/or Welsh, on average 94.0% (Table 
1).18 To test the national identity hypothesis, the 2011 census question on self-determined 
assessment of one’s national identity allowed us to calculate the percentage of residents whose 
national identity was English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish, or British, on average 94.2%.  
Economic issues 
To test the unemployment rate hypothesis, this study used the 2011 Census joint distribution of age 
and a person’s economic activity to determine the unemployment rate among those aged 16 to 74, 
on average 4.1% (Table 1). To test the socio-economic classification hypothesis, the study used the 
2011 Census joint distribution of age and Socio-economic Classification (NS-SeC) to calculate the 
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percentage of residents aged 16 to 74 who had a routine, semi-routine, lower supervisory or lower 
technical occupation, on average 33.0% (Table 1). To test the educational level hypothesis, the study 
used the 2011 Census question on people's highest educational qualification to determine the 
percentage of residents 16 or over having an educational level not higher than level 2 out of 4 levels, 
including no qualification that is on average 52.8% (Table 1).19  
Confounding factors 
Following Morgenstern (2008: 523), to reduce ecologic bias it is best to include covariates for 
categories of their joint distribution within groups. Using the 2011 Census this study used data 
available on the joint distribution of self-reported general health (percentage poor health)20 by age 
(aged 16–64, or 65+), gender by age (aged 16–64, or 65+), and self-reported general health 
(percentage poor health) by gender. Using EU referendum data provided by the electoral 
commission the turnout rate for each Local Authority was determined. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of data used on 380 Local Authorities in England, Scotland, and Wales. 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Outcome     
Proportion of Leave-votes UK (England, Wales, Scotland) 0.531 0.104 0.214 0.755 
Predictors     
Pct. migrants arrived between 2004–2011 of population 4.3 4.4 0.5 25.0 
Pct. national identity E/W/S/NI or British 94.2 6.2 64.4 99.3 
Pct. main language is English and/or Welsh 94.0 6.9 57.8 99.3 
Pct. unemployed  4.1 1.2 2.0 8.0 
Pct. having a (semi-) routine, a lower supervisory or a lower 
technical occupation 
33.0 7.3 13.9 51.7 
Pct. highest educational qualification is level 2 or lower 52.8 8.4 23.7 72.4 
Confounding factors     
Turnout rate 63.1 5.6 40.2 71.8 
Pct. poor health within age group 16–64  14.9 3.0 8.9 23.2 
Pct. poor health within age group 65+ 49.6 6.7 35.2 68.0 
Pct. male within age group 16–64 49.3 3.0 25.3 55.0 
Pct. male within age group 65+ 44.4 1.1 40.2 47.3 
Pct. poor health within males 17.5 3.1 10.8 26.2 
 
 
The data derived from the 2011 Census is on the whole local populations. Ideally, one would like to 
include information on just those who voted rather than on everyone. This information is hard to 
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find for local levels. Although for example the British Electoral Study is a big individual survey, it is 
not designed to investigate socio-economic and demographic distributions of voters and non-voters 
in the local level such as Local Authorities, as nearly all respondents in the wave 9 survey had voted 
during the EU referendum, and many Local Authorities show too small number of respondents to 
investigate properly the socio-economic and demographic distribution of voters and non-voters.  We 
do know, however, differences in turnout rate among Local Authorities. The turnout rate will be 
included in the analyses and therefore control for potential differences in voting behaviour among 
Local Authorities. 
 
Statistical methods 
A research question such as what proportion of the voters voted to leave the EU is an example of a 
variable bounded between zero and one and takes the form of fractional response data (e.g., 
Gardeazabal 2010). Following Papke and Wooldridge (1996), this study used a generalised linear 
model (GLM) with a binomial distribution and a logit link function. In the multivariable analyses p-
values and standard errors were adjusted for confounding factors and national residency by taking 
country as a cluster, taking into account the covariance between Local Authorities within a country. 
This allows us to examine more accurate associations between local factors and the proportion of 
Leave-votes than reports based on case studies, maps, frequencies and cross-tabulations. Following 
Frohlich et al. (2001), the analyses are not weighted by population (voters) size as the number of 
valid votes is not or only weakly correlated with the predictors and the outcome, and the study’s aim 
is to test ecological associations. All analyses were undertaken in Stata/MP 14.1 (StataCorp, College 
Station, Texas, USA). 
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The EU referendum outcomes in the Local Authorities of England, Scotland and Wales 
The EU referendum question was ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European 
Union or leave the European Union?’ and voters were asked to vote ‘Remain a member of the 
European Union’, or ‘Leave the European Union’. Eligible to vote were (a) a British or Irish citizen 
living in the UK, (b) a Commonwealth citizen living in the UK who has leave to remain in the UK or 
who does not require leave to remain in the UK, or (c) a British citizen living overseas who has been 
registered to vote in the UK in the last 15 years. Those persons could vote at a polling station on 23 
June between 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. by post after completing a postal vote application form and by 
proxy voting on a voter’s behalf.21 
On average, the Leave-vote carried 53.1% of all votes in 380 Local Authorities (Table 1). There were, 
however, substantial differences among those Local Authorities (see Figure 1). Support for ‘Leave’ 
was largest in Boston (75.6%). In 262 of the 380 Local Authorities the majority voted to ‘Leave’; that 
is 68.9%. In 20 Local Authorities between 50% and 51% voted ‘Leave’ and showed thus a very small 
majority in favour of leaving the EU. The five Local Authorities with the smallest majority were 
Watford, Cherwell, East Hertfordshire, Birmingham, Reigate and Banstead. The lowest support for 
‘Leave’, and thus the strongest for ‘Remain’, was in Lambeth where 21.4% voted ‘Leave’. In 118 of 
380 Local Authorities a majority voted ‘Remain’; that is 31.1%. In eight Local Authorities between 
49% and 50% voted ‘Leave’; these Local Authorities showed thus a very small majority in favour of 
remaining a member of the EU: Bromley, East Hampshire, Harrogate, Leeds, Monmouthshire, 
Moray, Newcastle upon Tyne, and Vale of Glamorgan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage voting to leave European Union in 380 Local Authorities in England, Scotland, 
and Wales. 
16 
 
 
 
Comparing the Leave-vote among Local Authorities 
In this section the observed differences in the proportion of Leave-votes among 380 Local 
Authorities are analysed through the use of a GLM. The results are presented in Table 2; a positive 
regression coefficient indicates a local factor is positively associated with the proportion of Leave-
votes. Models 1a-1f in Table 2 presents the results of univariable analyses (crude or unadjusted 
associations). Those univariable analyses show that the percentage of residents whose national 
identity is English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish, or British, the percentage of residents whose main 
language is English and/or Welsh, and the percentage of residents having a lower socio-economic 
job status are positively and significantly associated with the proportion of Leave-votes. For 
example, Local Authorities with an average percentage of residents reported their main language is 
English and/or Welsh (94%, Table 1) showed a mean proportion of Leave-votes (0.531).22 An increase 
of 1% in residents whose main language is English and/or Welsh (from 94% to 95%) resulted in an 
increase of the proportion of Leave-votes to 0.537. The percentage of recently arrived migrants is 
inversely and significantly associated with proportion of Leave-votes. The percentage of lower-
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educated and the percentage of unemployed do not show a significant association with the 
proportion of Leave-votes.  
Model 2 in Table 2 shows the results of all migrant- and economy-related factors together with some 
confounding factors. This multivariable model shows that the percentage of recently arrived 
migrants, the percentage of residents reported an English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish, or British 
identity, and the percentage of residents whose main language is English and/or Welsh are positively 
and significantly associated with the proportion of Leave-votes. As there were no significant non-
linear effects found, these effects are not reported in Table 2. Furthermore, this model shows that 
the turnout rate is positively and significantly associated with the proportion of Leave-votes. 
Moreover, after dividing the other confounding factors into tertiles the results in model 2 show that 
a higher percentage of residents aged 16–64 with poorer health and higher percentage of elderly 
with poorer health are positively and significantly associated with the proportion of Leave-votes. 
Finally, a higher percentage of male residents is also positively and significantly associated with the 
proportion of Leave-votes. The results presented in model 2 support the immigrant and national 
identity hypotheses. 
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Table 2: Regression coefficients of univariable and multivariable generalised linear models of local migrant and economic factors on the proportion of 
Leave-votes, adjusted for clustering at country level, 380 Local Authorities in England, Scotland, and Wales. 
 Models 1a-1f: univariable analyses Model 2: adjusted multivariable analysis 
Factors B-coef. 95% CI P-value B-coef. 95% CI P-value 
Pct. migrant arrived between 2004-2011 -0.045 -0.062; -0.027 <0.001 0.045 0.036; 0.055 <0.001 
Pct. national identity E/W/S/NI or British 0.033 0.019; 0.047 <0.001 0.020 0.016; 0.025 <0.001 
Pct. main language is English and/or Welsh 0.027 0.018; 0.036 <0.001 0.005 0.000; 0.009 0.049 
Pct. unemployed  0.026 -0.023; 0.075 0.300 0.033 -0.023; 0.010 0.287 
Pct. having a (semi-) routine, a lower supervisory or a lower technical occ. 0.036 0.013; 0.059 0.002 0.013 -0.010; 0.036 0.275 
Pct. highest educational qualification is level 2 or lower 0.028 -0.018; 0.073 0.236 0.022 -0019; 0.062 0.296 
Turnout rate    0.062 0.019; 0.104 0.004 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. poor health within age group 16–64 (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. poor health within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    -0.020 -0.050; 0.100 0.188 
3rd tertile pct. poor health within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    0.024 0.010; 0.037 0.001 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. poor health within age group 65+ (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. poor health within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.223 0.035; 0.102 <0.001 
3rd tertile pct. poor health within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.378 0.143; 0.611 0.002 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. males within age group 16–64 (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. males within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    0.067 0.026; 0.107 0.001 
3rd tertile pct. males within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    0.111 0.038; 0.186 0.003 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. males within age group 65+ (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. males within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.096 0.023; 0.169 0.010 
3rd tertile pct. males within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.036 -0.014; 0.086 0.162 
1st tertile (lowest) poor health among males (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. poor health among males (ref. tertile 1)    0.096 -0.065; 0.113 0.257 
3rd tertile pct. poor health among males (ref. tertile 1)    0.154 -0.064; 0.373 0.165 
Constant    -9.042 -10.685;-7.400 <0.001 
Ref.=reference category, B-coef.=B-coefficient, CI= confidence interval 
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Table 3: Regression coefficients of univariable and multivariable generalised linear models of local migration and economic factors on the proportion of 
Leave-votes, 326 Local Authorities in England. 
 Models 1a-1f: univariable analyses Model 2: adjusted multivariable analysis 
Factors B-coef. 95% CI P-value B-coef. 95% CI P-value 
Pct. migrant arrived between 2004–2011 -0.051 -0.062; -0.041 <0.001 0.040 -0.003; 0.084 0.070 
Pct. national identity E/W/S/NI or British 0.038 0.031; 0.046 <0.001 0.022 -0.019; 0.064 0.288 
Pct. main language is English and/or Welsh  0.031 0.023; 0.038 <0.001 -0.001 -0.013; 0.011 0.819 
Pct. unemployed  0.043 0.001; 0.084 0.046 -0.052 -0.010; -0.005 0.032 
Pct. having a (semi-) routine, a lower supervisory or a lower technical occ. 0.046 0.042; 0.050 <0.001 0.004 -0.003; 0.011 0.309 
Pct. highest educational qualification is level 2 or lower 0.048 0.046; 0.052 <0.001 0.055 0.048; 0.061 <0.001 
Turnout rate    0.010 -0.001; 0.021 0.062 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. poor health within age group 16–64 (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. poor health within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    -0.020 -0.075; 0.036 0.486 
3rd tertile pct. poor health within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    -0.041 -0.130; 0.048 0.363 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. poor health within age group 65+ (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. poor health within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.059 0.003; 0.116 0.040 
3rd tertile pct. poor health within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.058 -0.033; 0.148 0.211 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. males within age group 16–64 (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. males within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    -0.001 -0.051; 0.050 0.977 
3rd tertile pct. males within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    0.037 -0.012; 0.085 0.142 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. males within age group 65+ (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. males within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.039 -0.007; 0.084 0.094 
3rd tertile pct. males within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.005 -0.050; 0.060 0.863 
1st tertile (lowest) poor health among males (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. poor health among males (ref. tertile 1)    -0.052 -0.117; 0.014 0.120 
3rd tertile pct. poor health among males (ref. tertile 1)    -0.035 -0.125; 0.055 0.443 
Constant    -5.467 -9.312; -1.621 0.005 
Ref.=reference category, B-coef.=B-coefficient, CI= confidence interval 
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The results presented in Table 3 focus only on Local Authorities in England, where most of the voters 
lived and where a majority voted to leave the EU (54.5%, supplementary Table 1). Concentrating on 
model 2 in Table 3, there is weak evidence of a positive association between the percentage of 
recently arrived migrants and the proportion of Leave-votes. In Figure 2 the predicted linear effect of 
percentage of recently arrived migrants is shown separately for England, Scotland and Wales 
together and for England only, while the other predictors are taken at their mean values for the 
calculation, showing a steeper increase and a smaller 95% confidence interval for the England, 
Scotland and Wales model.  
 
Figure 2: Predicted linear effect of percentage (95% confidence interval) of recently arrived migrants 
on proportion of Leave-votes. 
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Furthermore, in the England model the percentage of lower educated residents is positively and 
significantly associated with the proportion of Leave-votes, while the percentage of unemployed is 
(unexpectedly) inversely and significantly associated. As there were again no significant non-linear 
effects found, these effects are not reported in Table 3. Moreover, this England model shows a weak 
evidence of a positive association between turnout rate and the proportion of Leave-votes and some 
evidence of a positive association between the percentages of elderly with poorer health and the 
proportion of Leave-votes. Those results based on Local Authorities in England support the 
hypothesis on educational level, while they show some weak evidence supporting the immigrant 
hypothesis.  
Since within the London Local Authorities only a minority voted to leave the EU (39.1%), the results 
of a model based on non–London English Local Authorities (Table 4, model 2) are compared to the 
results of the England model (Table 3, model 2). The results show a similar effect of percentage of 
lower-educated people on the proportion of Leave-votes. In Figure 3 the predicted linear effect of 
percentage of lower-educated people is shown separately for the all Local Authorities in England and 
for non–London English Local Authorities, while the other predictors are taken at their mean values 
for the calculation, showing a similar increase and a 95% confidence interval. Furthermore, within 
English Local Authorities outside London there are non-significant associations of the percentage of 
recently arrived migrants and the percentage of unemployed with the proportion of Leave-votes, 
while there is a stronger association found for the turnout rate and the percentage of elderly with 
poorer health. These results based on non–London English Local Authorities only support the 
educational level hypothesis. The absence of an association between the percentage of recently 
arrived migrants and the proportion of Leave-votes within English Local Authorities outside London 
might be due to the narrower range of the percentage of recently arrived migrants within English 
Local Authorities outside London (min.= 0.50%, max.=18.0%, supplementary Table 2) when 
compared to the 33 London Local Authorities (min.=3.1%, max.=25.0%) while within English Local 
Authorities outside London a majority voted to leave the EU (56.2%, supplementary Table 2).  
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Figure 3: Predicted linear effect of percentage (95% confidence interval) of lower-educated persons 
on the proportion of Leave-votes. 
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Table 4: Regression coefficients of univariable and multivariable generalised linear models of local migration and economic factors on the proportion of 
Leave-votes, 293 non–London Local Authorities in England. 
 Models 1a-1f: univariable analyses Model 2: adjusted multivariable analysis 
Factors B-coef. 95% CI P-value B-coef. 95% CI P-value 
Pct. migrant arrived between 2004–2011 -0.033 -0.052; -0.014 0.001 0.015 -0.030; 0.060 0.521 
Pct. national identity E/W/S/NI or British 0.028 0.014; 0.042 <0.001 0.004 -0.037; 0.044 0.855 
Pct. main language is English and/or Welsh  0.017 0.006; 0.238 0.002 0.002 -0.011; 0.015 0.752 
Pct. unemployed  0.120 0.089; 0.150 <0.001 -0.026 -0.070; -0.018 0.248 
Pct. having a (semi-) routine, a lower supervisory or a lower technical occ. 0.039 0.035; 0.042 <0.001 0.005 -0.002; 0.012 0.153 
Pct. highest educational qualification is level 2 or lower 0.046 0.042; 0.049 <0.001 0.050 0.044; 0.057 <0.001 
Turnout rate    0.013 0.003; 0.023 0.013 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. poor health within age group 16–64 (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. poor health within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    -0.011 -0.067; 0.044 0.690 
3rd tertile pct. poor health within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    -0.075 -0.161; 0.010 0.083 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. poor health within age group 65+ (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. poor health within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.065 0.012; 0.118 0.016 
3rd tertile pct. poor health within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.108 0.023; 0.192 0.012 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. males within age group 16–64 (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. males within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    0.010 -0.038; 0.0658 0.685 
3rd tertile pct. males within age group 16–64 (ref. tertile 1)    0.046 -0.003; 0.095 0.066 
1st tertile (lowest) pct. males within age group 65+ (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. males within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.048 -0.002; 0.094 0.043 
3rd tertile pct. males within age group 65+ (ref. tertile 1)    0.020 -0.032; 0.072 0.446 
1st tertile (lowest) poor health among males (ref.)    Ref.   
2nd tertile pct. poor health among males (ref. tertile 1)    -0.049 -0.108; 0.010 0.105 
3rd tertile pct. poor health among males (ref. tertile 1)    -0.029 -0.117; 0.058 0.509 
Constant    -4.094 -7.941; -0.246 0.037 
Ref.=reference category, B-coef.=B-coefficient, CI= confidence interval 
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Conclusions and discussion 
A referendum is a unique national event for sociologists to study social cleavages and cohesion by 
examining the outcome across different groups or local areas. Though a majority of the voters in the 
UK voted to leave the EU during the UK’s referendum on their EU membership, the outcome shows 
wide variation on both the country level and the Local Authority level. Since there are a few hundred 
Local Authorities in the UK, investigating referendum outcomes at the Local Authority level creates 
an opportunity to compare local referendum outcomes and to associate these outcomes with local 
characteristics such as migration- and economy-related issues. This study conducted multivariable 
GLM analyses for three different models: 1-Local Authorities in England, Scotland, and Wales, 2- 
Local Authorities in England, and 3-Local Authorities in England without London.  
The percentage of recently arrived migrants showed a positive association with the proportion of 
Leave-votes, especially in the model with England, Scotland and Wales together. As this indicates 
that the relative number of recently arrived migrants in local areas might have been a key factor in 
voters’ decision, further research might focus on the origin of those migrants in local areas since the 
UK already can control migration from non-EU countries. Furthermore, the positive associations of 
an English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish, or British identity and English/Welsh language with the 
proportion of Leave-votes in the model with England, Scotland and Wales together might point to 
other factors such as nationalism. Whereas the underlying assumption of the formulated hypotheses 
in this study are based on the so-called issue-voting explanation (e.g., Denver & Hands 1990), it 
might be worthwhile in future research to also include (ecological) data, if available, on voters’ 
attitudes towards their national political parties and incumbent national government. 
Especially in the England models the percentage of lower-educated persons showed a positive 
association with the proportion of Leave-votes, while socio-economic status and unemployment rate 
showed respectively no association or an inconsistent association. This indicates that England was 
especially divided along educational lines, and further research might investigate underlying 
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perspectives and circumstances among the lower educated. Furthermore, other economic issues 
related to economic precariousness might be worthwhile to explore in future research, for example 
employment insecurity such as part-time or temporary employed, income insecurity such as 
earnings, and representation insecurity such as trade union membership and representation (e.g., 
Berrington, Tammes & Roberts 2014: 3; Standing 2011). 
Future research might also focus on issues other than migration and economy. As it has been said 
that especially the elderly voted to leave the EU, this study showed that it might be those elderly 
with self-reported poorer general health. It could be worthwhile to explore issues related to local 
health outcomes as in the model with England, Scotland and Wales together shows also a positive 
association between the percentage of adults aged 16–64 with self-reported poorer health and the 
proportion of Leave-votes. Furthermore, some models show a positive association between the 
percentage of male residents and the proportion of Leave-votes, suggesting a gender issue which 
might be worth exploring further. 
The measurements in the analyses were based on information over 2011, five years before the 
referendum, and on the whole population of the Local Authorities. Ideally, one would like to include 
information on just those who voted rather than on everyone. Although differences in distributions 
of voters according to background characteristics is unknown, this study included the local turnout 
rates to control for potential differences in voting behaviour among Local Authorities. Local 
Authorities have not changed much in ranking between 2001 and 2011 according to unemployment 
rate, percentage of UK-born, and percentage of elderly. Assuming little change in ranking between 
2011 and 2016, the five-year gap between the Census data and the referendum might not be very 
problematic. The 2011 Census data were therefore seen as suitable to conduct this study. By 
comparing Local Authorities and including multiple factors within the same model, this study could 
conduct multivariable regression models and present (adjusted) statistical relevant associations 
between local characteristics and the EU referendum outcome. However, the referendum outcomes 
26 
 
for the Northern Ireland local districts are not included in the presented analyses. Since in Northern 
Ireland a minority voted ‘Leave’, including these local districts in the models could alter some of the 
results. Furthermore, given the ecological nature of the data (aggregated to Local Authorities), one 
can’t infer associations for individual voters (e.g., Morgenstern 2008: 519–520).  
As it is unclear what Brexit means, knowing more about differences in the EU referendum outcome 
between groups and local areas provides us with a better understanding of underlying factors of the 
Brexit-vote. This might be informative for the UK government in negotiating the Leave-conditions 
with the EU, and for the implementation of replacement regulations and policies. However, 
following Dorling (2016) about 13 million registered voters did not vote, and a further 7 million 
eligible adults were not registered. We don’t know their preference, to remain in or to leave the EU, 
and their reasons for not voting.  As it has been said these non-voters were disproportionately 
youngsters, renters, and members of ethnic minorities. They might have preferred to stay in the EU 
following the results of several post-referendum polls conducted in the summer suggesting that 
between 28% and 40% of non-voters believed it was wrong to leave the EU while 20% to 28% 
believed it was right.23 To get a more complete picture of preferences on UK’s relation with Europe it 
is worthwhile to investigate those non-voting groups. Although UK’s history with the EU might differ 
from that of some other EU members, the findings from this study might also be of interest to the 
governments of other EU countries, especially EU members with a similar economic and socio-
demographic composition as the UK. 
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Appendix 
Supplementary Table 1: Descriptive statistics of used Local Authority data in England (N=326). 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Outcome     
Proportion of Leave-votes England (N=326) 0.545 0.100 0.214 0.756 
Predictors     
Pct. migrants arrived between 2004–2011 of population 4.6 4.6 0.5 25.0 
Pct. national identity E/W/S/NI or British 93.7 6.5 64.4 99.3 
Pct. main language is English and/or Welsh 93.7 7.0 58.6 99.3 
Pct. unemployed  4.0 1.2 2.0 8.0 
Pct. having a (semi-) routine, a lower supervisory or a lower 
technical occupation 
32.2 7.2 13.9 51.7 
Pct. highest educational qualification is level 2 or lower 51.4 7.8 23.7 66.0 
Confounding factors     
Turnout rate 74.4 4.9 59.3 83.6 
Pct. poor health within age group 16–64  14.7 2.9 8.9 23.2 
Pct. poor health within age group 65+ 49.7 6.4 36.2 68.0 
Pct. male within age group 16–64 49.3 3.0 25.3 54.8 
Pct. male within age group 65+ 44.5 1.0 41.2 47.3 
Pct. poorer health within males 17.3 3.1 10.8 25.9 
 
 
Supplementary Table 2: Descriptive statistics of used non–London English Local Authority data 
(N=293). 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Outcome     
Proportion of Leave-votes England, excl. London (N=293) 0.562 0.080 0.262 0.756 
Predictors     
Pct. migrants arrived between 2004–2011 of population 3.5 2.9 0.5 18.0 
Pct. national identity E/W/S/NI or British 95.4 3.6 77.8 99.3 
Pct. main language is English and/or Welsh 95.5 4.0 72.5 99.3 
Pct. unemployed  3.9 1.2 2.0 8.0 
Pct. having a (semi-) routine, a lower supervisory or a lower 
technical occupation 
33.3 6.6 17.1 51.7 
Pct. highest educational qualification is level 2 or lower 52.7 6.4 27.4 66.0 
Confounding factors     
Turnout rate 74.9 4.6 59.8 83.6 
Pct. poor health within age group 16–64  14.8 3.0 8.9 23.2 
Pct. poor health within age group 65+ 49.2 6.2 36.2 64.9 
Pct. male within age group 16–64 49.3 3.2 25.3 54.8 
Pct. male within age group 65+ 44.6 1.0 41.3 47.3 
Pct. poorer health within males 17.6 3.1 10.8 25.9 
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